Arctic Cat Inc., v. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. BRP U.S. Inc. (CAFC Opinion, February 19, 2020)

The Federal Circuit issued a second opinion in this matter concerning the date damages accrue and patent marking. In its first opinion from December 2017, the court vacated the jury verdict from the Southern District of Florida, finding it was premised on the district court’s erroneous judgment on marking. Marking was important in this matter, because Arctic Cat sought damages prior to the date on which it served its complaint on Bombardier. Arctic Cat argued that it should be allowed damages going back in time before the date of its complaint, because a licensee to its patents in suit (i.e., Honda) sold a product that practiced the patent in the earlier time period.

In the first round of this litigation, the district court determined that to allow defendant Bombardier to limit damages to the date the complaint was filed, it was Bombardier’s burden to show that licensee-Honda had failed to mark its practicing products with Arctic Cat’s patents. Bombardier did not meet its burden per the District Court, and thus the damages period extended prior to Arctic Cat’s serving of its complaint.

The Federal Circuit explained in its 2017 opinion that the burden of marking was on the patent-holder Arctic Cat, not the defendant Bombardier. If the patent holder seeks damages prior to notice, it must prove its licensee marked practicing product. In its 2020 opinion, the Federal Circuit reiterated its findings from December 2017 that the burden of proof for marking falls upon the patent holder, not an alleged infringer.

In this latest opinion, the Federal Circuit considered when damages should accrue based on information that Arctic Cat’s licensee, Honda, both did not mark its product and stopped selling its unmarked practicing product prior to filing of the suit. Because there were no products to mark in the year or so prior to filing of the complaint, Arctic Cat argued that damages should accrue at least from when Honda stopped selling unmarked licensed products; but possibly back six years from filing based on Bombardier’s willful infringement. The District Court for its part ruled in favor of defendant Bombardier, which Arctic appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion that damages do not start and stop based on sales of an unmarked practicing product. It reiterated that in order for a patent holder to collect damages prior to notice, where a product practicing the patent(s) in suit is sold, that product must be marked. If a practicing product is sold but unmarked at any point in time, then the patent holder cannot seek damages prior to notice to the alleged infringer. The court also held that a finding of willfulness is irrelevant to when damages begin to accrue.

Netfuel, Inc. v. Cisco Systems Inc. (Order, March 17, 2020)

Judge Davila from the Northern District of California granted a Defendant’s motion to strike the technical expert and damages expert opinions on apportionment, and the damages expert report on all other issues as well. The court’s order serves as a cautionary tale not only for technical experts, but also for damages experts who would rely on technical experts for apportionment.

Plaintiff’s damages expert, Walter Bratic, relied on technical expert, Aviel Rubin, for an apportionment analysis. Dr. Rubin informed Mr. Bratic that certain percentages of practicing products and accused products were associated with the patents in suit. Mr. Bratic applied those percentages to his damages figures to apportion royalty rates. The court found, however, that Dr. Rubin’s percentages were “plucked out of thin air.” As such, the court further ruled that Mr. Bratic’s damages analysis, which relied on those percentages, would not be presented to the jury.

While reliance on a technical expert for damages opinions is both allowed and encouraged, it must also itself be subject to the damages expert’s critical consideration. Judge Davila made clear that a damages expert may not blindly rely upon a technical expert whose opinions have no basis in the facts of the case, but instead derive solely from his or her unrelated expertise. Damages experts must assess the reasonableness or the logic of the opinions relied upon. In this matter, while the apportionment exercise was not performed by Mr. Bratic himself, reliance on Dr. Rubin’s resulted in the exclusion of both.

Mr. Bratic’s comparable license approach to damages was also struck for being “plucked out of thin air.” Heavily citing the GPNE Corp. matter as well as LaserDynamics, the court rejected Plaintiff’s damages analysis in its entirety:

Finally, in this instance, the court would not entertain a “do over.” Judge Davila sagely noted, “Allowing a ‘second bite’ can encourage ‘overreaching on the first bite.'” We decidedly welcome that perspective.

Bioverativ Inc., et al. v. CSL Behring LLC, et al. (Opinion, March 4, 2020)

This opinion by Judge Andrews in Delaware provides insight into the court’s thinking with respect to convoyed sales. Ultimately, the court excluded certain opinions of Dr. Matthew Lynde, plaintiffs’ damages expert, based upon his opinion that non-infringing uses of the drug at issue constituted convoyed sales and, therefore, were subject to damages.

This case involved not a patented drug itself, but rather “infringing prophylaxis uses and non-infringing prophylaxis and on-demand uses.” Judge Andrews agreed with defendants that those sales to patients prescribed a non-infringing dosing regimen should not be subject to damages. Citing American Seating and Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, the court explained that such non-infringing sales – generally subject to separate prescription – were not available for damages because they did not pass the functional unit test.

Plaintiffs’ damages here appear a simple case of over-reach.

In Re Chanbond Litigation (Opinion, February 4, 2020)

Judge Andrews of Delaware has provided a host of opinions to help guide patent damages experts. Despite his detailed and well-articulated opinions, patent damages experts continue to fail his gatekeeper tests. Such is the case for Mr. Christopher Bakewell in a recent opinion.

Mr. Bakewell, defendant’s damages expert, was excluded from offering his market approach opinion which appeared to have three “valuation datapoints.” The first datapoint involved investment solicitations for financial interests in the company holding the patents-in-suit. The second was a series of patent transfers among interested parties that were ultimately valuing the litigation and not the patents. The final datapoint was an offer to sell the patents-in-suit, which Judge Andrews found relevant but not sufficient to support a market approach on its own.

With respect to the first datapoint, Judge Andrews offered the following guidance:

With respect to the second datapoint, Judge Andrews did not simply accept a patent transaction as relevant to valuing the patents-in-suit. Rather, he pointed to a measure of circular-reasoning, wherein parties to a transaction value prospective litigation, rather than the patents themselves… which in turn is used for damages purposes in litigation:

Further, rather than afford “a transaction” some measure of casual abstraction, Judge Andrews considered the purchaser and seller of those patents. He explained:

Indeed, Mr. Bakewell needed to acknowledge the incentives of the parties to the transaction making these decisions.

Ultimately, Judge Andrews found the last datapoint relevant for damages, but not sufficiently developed to support an affirmative damages opinion. The three-pronged analysis was excluded, one prong at a time.